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Explaining Variations in Client Extra Costs between Software Projects 
Offshored to India 
 
Abstract 
Gaining economic benefits from substantially lower labor costs has been reported as a major reason for 
offshoring labor-intensive information systems (IS) services to low-wage countries; however, if wage 
differences are so high, why is there such a high level of variation in the economic success between offshored IS 
projects? This study argues that offshore outsourcing involves a number of extra costs for the client organization 
that account for the economic failure of offshore projects. The objective is to disaggregate these extra costs into 
its constituent parts and to explain why they differ between offshored software projects. The focus is set on 
software development and maintenance projects that are offshored to Indian vendors. A theoretical framework is 
developed a priori based on transaction cost economics (TCE) and the knowledge-based view of the firm, 
complemented by factors that acknowledge the specific offshore context. The framework is empirically 
explored using a multiple case study design including six offshored software projects in a large German 
Financial Service institution. The results of our analysis indicate that the client incurs post contractual extra 
costs for four types of activities: (1) requirements specification and design, (2) knowledge transfer, (3) control, 
and (4) coordination. In projects that require a high level of client-specific knowledge about idiosyncratic 
business processes and software systems, these extra costs were found to be substantially higher than in projects 
were more general knowledge was needed. Notably, these costs most often arose independently from the threat 
of opportunistic behavior, challenging the predominant TCE logic of market failure. Rather, the client extra 
costs were particularly high in client-specific projects because the effort for managing the consequences of the 
knowledge asymmetries between client and vendor were particularly high in these projects. Prior experiences of 
the vendor with related client projects were found to reduce the level of extra costs but could not fully offset the 
increase in extra costs in highly client-specific projects. Moreover, cultural and geographic distance between 
client and vendor as well as personnel turnover were found to increase client extra costs. Slight evidence was 
found, however, that the cost increasing impact of these factors was also leveraged in projects with a high level 
of required client-specific knowledge (moderator effect). 
 
Keywords: Offshoring, outsourcing, software application services, transaction cost economics, knowledge-
based view, absorptive capacity, cross-cultural study, asset specificity, multiple case study. 
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Introduction 
Offshore outsourcing of information systems (IS) has seen considerable growth during the past years, especially 
in the domain of application services. Aside from getting access to skilled and qualified resources, reaping 
benefits from substantially lower labor costs has been reported as one of the major reasons for offshoring (Apte 
et al. 1997; Khan et al. 2003; Rottman and Lacity 2004; Schaaf 2004; Sobol and Apte 1995). Similarly to 
domestic outsourcing, however, there are indications that the expected economic benefits are not always 
achieved. While realized cost savings through offshore outsourcing may range around 20-50%, studies also 
show that in about 50% of the cases offshore projects fail to achieve cost savings or that costs actually increase 
(Hatch 2004; Schaaf 2004). Obviously there are situations where a number of “extra costs” arise in offshore 
outsourcing that can offset the client’s expected cost savings from lower labor costs in low-wage countries 
(Carmel and Tija 2005, p. 40). 
While attempts have been made to identify and categorize extra offshore cost items (Carmel and Tija 2005; 
Overby 2003), there is still little knowledge about the sources of their magnitude, i.e. how much of these extra 
costs should be calculated into the business case of a particular offshore project. Whenever different types of 
extra costs, such as transaction costs (e.g., initiation, contracting and control costs), were distinguished in 
previous studies, little attempt was made to explain why those costs may differ between particular offshore 
projects (Carmel and Nicholson 2005). Variations in project performance were predominantly examined from 
the vendor rather than the client side. For example, it was found that vendor performance metrics such as project 
effort, elapsed time, and software rework are contingent on a number of project characteristics such as the use of 
standardized processes, project complexity or prior experiences of the vendor personnel (Gopal et al. 2002). 
Moreover, it is not clear how the offshore outsourcing context, i.e. the fact that an IS function is outsourced to 
another country actually influences the economic success of an offshore project. Some studies identified various 
types of risks or challenges associated with offshore outsourcing (Apte et al. 1997; Carmel and Agarwal 2002; 
Khan et al. 2003; Kliem 2004; Ramarapu and Parzinger 1997). There is still little understanding, however, about 
the relationships between offshore-specific challenges, such as cultural differences, geographic distance or 
regulatory/legal differences, and further economic risks, such as extra costs (Hogan 2004; Barthelemy 2001). 
The fact that offshore regions, such as China and India, were found to differ in transaction costs (Qu and 
Brocklehurst 2003), however, clearly indicates that the magnitude of extra costs is influenced by offshore-
specific factors.  
When examining the emergent literature on IS offshoring, it is also striking that the majority of research has 
focused on how to best manage offshore projects (Carmel and Agarwal 2001; Gopal et al. 2003; Heeks et al. 
2001; Kliem 2004; Krishna et al. 2004; Nicholson and Sahay 2001). While these studies have greatly enhanced 
our understanding of how to address some of the offshore-specific challenges, little recognition has been given 
to the alignment of management practices to specific project properties, which may lead to the impression that 
virtually any type of service can successfully be outsourced offshore if only the appropriate management 
techniques are applied. This view, however, would be in stark contrast to research findings from domestic 
outsourcing which emphasize that beyond the downstream importance of managing the relationship with the 
vendor, the decision on what to outsource has important implications for relationship management practices and 
outsourcing success (Grover et al. 1996; Lacity and Willcocks 1998).  
As offshore outsourcing1 is actually a ‘buy’ strategy with a vendor located in a country different from that of the 
client (Carmel and Tjia 2005, p. 103), research on offshoring can fruitfully build on these insights from research 
on domestic outsourcing. The most applied theoretical lens to examine the linkage between the properties of IS 
functions and the economic efficiency of outsourcing has been transaction cost economics (TCE) (Dibbern et al. 
2004). The sole recognition of TCE for explaining the conditions of market efficiency, however, has come under 
scrutiny more recently. In particular, the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm has been suggested as a 
complementary stream of reasoning (Conner and Prahalad 1996; Grant 1996). It acknowledges the fact that 
knowledge is heterogeneously distributed across firms and that the management of knowledge asymmetries 
between client and vendor can lead to extra costs for the client organization, independent of vendor 
opportunism. Accordingly, our study attempts to build on both TCE and KBV to explain variations in extra 
offshoring costs, expanding both perspectives with offshore-specific factors. The focus of our analysis is set on 
software development and maintenance projects. Both the development and maintenance of software are labor 
                                                          
1 The decision of ‘buy versus build’ is inherent in any type of offshoring strategy (Carmel and Tjia 2005, p. 
103 ff.). While ‘buy’ refers to offshore outsourcing or out-tasking to third parties, a ‘build’ strategy implies 
ownership of offshore resources, such as in captive centers or subsidiaries. Hybrid arrangements such as joint 
ventures also exist. 
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intensive tasks and hence are most likely to be offshored from the portfolio of IS functions (Hirschheim et al. 
2004). Having set the focus of this study, our research objective can be summarized by the following research 
questions: 
1. What types of extra costs may arise for the client in offshored software projects? 
2. How and why do these client extra costs vary between offshored software projects? 2 
In the next section, we will provide the theoretical foundation for studying these research questions. An a priori 
framework will be developed to serve as a basis for analyzing the extra costs of a number of software projects 
that are offshored to Indian vendors by a leading German financial services provider. From our theoretical and 
empirical reflections, we are able to derive a refined theoretical understanding of the composition of client extra 
costs and their main drivers. Moreover, based on our findings, implications for research are outlined and final 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical framework of this study is built on the complementary theoretical perspectives of TCE and 
KBV. These two theories of the firm are complemented by offshore-specific factors that are derived from 
existing literature on the international division of labor. Figure 1 presents a graphical illustration of this 
framework.  
The framework essentially suggests that offshore outsourcing is associated with a number of extra costs for the 
client that go beyond the contract-based payments to the vendor. These extra costs arise for activities such as 
controlling vendor performance, coordinating project resources, transferring knowledge to vendor personnel, as 
well as specifying software requirements. Based on TCE and KBV, it is argued that the level of extra costs for 
the client critically depends on the degree of required client-specific knowledge as well as the vendor’s 
absorptive capacity. Moreover, offshore-specific client-vendor distance may also lead to increased costs on the 
client side. The influential role of these specific offshore barriers as well as the impact of the vendor’s 
absorptive capacity is influenced (i.e., moderated) by the degree of required client-specific knowledge. The 
discussion below elaborates upon each of the key constructs and relationships. 
                                                          
2  The goal of our study is to explain variations in extra costs between offshored software projects. Therefore, 
we focus on a comparison of different offshored software projects; we do not intend to compare offshored 
projects to in-house projects or domestic outsourcing projects. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
 
Decomposing Client Extra Costs 
Before elaborating on the specific cost categories that arise for the client during the process of offshore 
outsourcing (research question 1), it is necessary to define the broad term “extra costs”. Extra costs are defined 
as all costs in terms of time, effort, and resources spent by the client organization that go beyond the actual 
payments to the vendor, i.e. beyond compensating the vendor’s costs plus paying the vendor’s profit margin 
(Carmel and Tija 2005, p. 40).3 The payments to the vendor could either be specified in a fixed price contract or 
accounted for in a time and material contract (Rottman and Lacity 2004). Occasionally, it comes to contract 
adaptations during an outsourcing relationship which may lead to additional payments to the vendor. In addition 
to contract-based payments, however, the client’s extra costs for managing an offshore project need to be taken 
into account. These extra costs can gradually offset the cost savings from lower payments to offshore vendors 
(see Figure 2: if extra costs increase, cost savings go down or costs may even become higher than before 
offshore outsourcing).  
 
                                                          
3  Extra costs have also been referred to as “remaining or new costs after outsourcing “ (Lancellotti et al. 
2003, p. 134) or they have been labeled as "hidden costs" (Barthélemy 2001; Overby 2003). 
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Figure 2. Role of Client Extra Costs in Calculating Cost Savings from Offshore Outsourcing 
 
Quite often, these extra costs are underestimated when it comes to offshoring application services (Carmel and 
Tija 2005; Overby 2003; Rottman and Lacity 2004). Extra costs for the client can arise for a number of 
activities.4 These activities can be separated into three phases: the pre-contractual phase, the transition phase, 
and the service delivery phase (see Figure 3). The focus of our study will be on non-contractual costs that arise 
for the client organization during the transition and delivery phase. As such, the focus is set on the costs for 
requirements specification and design, knowledge transfer, control and coordination. An overview of the 
relevant cost categories and their definitions is presented in Table 1.  
Specification/
design costs
Phase 1:
Onshore Transition
Phase 2:
Onshore/Offshore Delivery
Focus of Study
Phase 0:
Pre-Contractual
Knowledge
transfer
costs
Coordination 
costs
Control 
costs
Contract
adaptation 
costs
Search
costs
Contract /
Negotiation
costs
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4  It should be noted that the calculation of costs based on the underlying activities of these costs equals the 
fundamentals of activity-based costing  (see Lammers et al. 2004).  
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Table 1. Definition of Extra Cost Categories 
Cost category Definition Source 
Specification costs  Client costs associated with the process of explaining and 
defining what services are required from the system and 
identifying the constraints on systems operation and 
development. 
Based on  
Sommerville (2004, 
p. 75) 
Design costs Client costs associated with the “description of the structure of 
the software to be implemented, the data which is part of the 
system, the interfaces between the system components, and, 
sometimes, algorithms used.” 
Sommerville (2004, 
p. 76) 
Knowledge transfer 
costs 
Costs associated with the communication of knowledge from 
the client organization so that it is learned and applied by the 
offshore vendor. 
Based on Ko et al. 
(2005, p. 62) 
Coordination costs Costs for integrating and linking together client and vendor 
resources to accomplish a collective set of tasks. 
Based on Van de Ven 
et al. (1976, p. 322) 
Control costs Costs for ensuring that the vendor acts and performs in a manner 
that is consistent with achieving the desired objectives of the 
client. 
Based on Choudhury 
and Sabherwal (2003, 
p. 292) 
 
Requirements Specification/Design and Knowledge Transfer Costs 
For understanding these extra costs, it is important to consider the nature of the task that is delegated from the 
client to the offshore vendor. Software development and maintenance are both labor intensive tasks (Boehm 
1987; De Marco and Lister 1987). Both can be characterized as the “the processing of knowledge in a very 
focused way […], moving from the knowledge application domain to software architectural and algorithmic 
design knowledge, and ending in programming language statements” (Robillard 1999, p. 92). In broad terms, 
the required knowledge that needs to be processed can be separated into two spheres: “(1) knowledge about the 
application problem domain and (2) technical knowledge through which a software solution is developed.” 
(Tiwana 2003, p. 259; see also Tiwana 2004).  
Offshore outsourcing, like domestic outsourcing, implies a contract-based separation of the sources of both 
types of knowledge (Beath and Walker 1998; Tiwana 2003). The application domain knowledge usually resides 
at the client side. The client continually produces new application domain knowledge which reflects its 
constantly changing business requirements. While it is necessary for the client to keep a certain level of 
technical understanding, e.g. architectural knowledge, when outsourcing an IS function to an external vendor, 
the majority of the technological knowledge is the responsibility of the vendor. Accordingly, offshore 
outsourcing brings about the challenge of integrating both types of knowledge (Beath and Walker 1998; Tiwana 
2003). Knowledge integration can be achieved in a twofold way (Conner and Prahalad 1996, p. 485). First, the 
client could transfer his application domain knowledge to the vendor. This would include the transfer of 
knowledge about the business processes and the user information needs that are to be reflected by the software 
application. Moreover, the vendor has to gain a solid understanding of the client’s existing technical 
infrastructure including source and target applications of the software application which is to be developed or 
maintained. Having adopted the necessary client domain knowledge, the vendor would then be able to specify 
the major functional requirements as well as to perform the design, coding, implementation and testing. Second, 
the client could take over the majority of the requirements specification (or even the design). This form of 
knowledge integration may be referred to as knowledge substitution (Conner and Prahalad 1996, p. 485), since 
the vendor can work mostly from the detailed specifications (or even software design) of the client without the 
need to fully understand the application domain background.5  
“Knowledge-substitution is a fundamental response to cognitive limitations, having the effect of 
economizing on them. Knowledge substitution expands Y’s [the vendor’s] productive capability without 
requiring fully concomitant knowledge absorption by Y.” (Conner and Prahalad 1996, p. 485) 
                                                          
5  Demsetz argues: “Direction substitutes for education (that is for the transfer of knowledge itself)” 
(Demsetz, 1988, p. 172, cited by Conner, 1996, p. 172). Specification may also be viewed as a form of 
“direction” for the subsequent tasks in the software life cycle. 
  
8 
 
 
Both activities, knowledge transfer and specification (or even design), require the client to invest time, effort 
and resources leading to knowledge transfer and specification costs. They have also been referred to as 
complementary procedural coordination strategies that need to be balanced out in any interorganizational 
relationship for product development in general (Sobrero and Roberts 2001), as well as in offshore outsourcing 
of application development and maintenance in particular (Mirani 2007). Typically, a transition phase is agreed 
upon in offshore outsourcing. In this transition phase, key vendor personnel stay onshore for a certain period of 
time to enable the transfer of knowledge from the client to the vendor (Mirani 2007; Tiwana 2004). In addition, 
the vendor personnel can work out the functional specifications with the client in a collaborative way (Heeks et 
al. 2001; Krishna et al. 2004). The initial specifications of requirements often need to be modified or 
complemented during the actual service delivery phase, leading to re-specification costs (Apte 1990). Moreover, 
additional knowledge transfer is likely to occur during the service delivery phase (Mirani 2007).  
 
Control and Coordination Costs 
Two additional types of extra costs that typically arise in interorganizational relationships such as offshore 
outsourcing are the costs for coordinating the offshore project as well as the costs for controlling the vendor’s 
performance. Both control and coordination have been identified as two important activities in the management 
of software projects, in general, (Banker et al. 2006; Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997) as well as in 
offshore software projects, in particular (Sabherwal and Choudhury 2006). Although the two types of costs are 
interrelated in that “(…) [i]mproved coordination helps in the exercise of control while effective control may 
improve coordination” (Sabherwal and Choudhury 2006, p. 190), they represent two distinct concepts 
(Benslimane et al. 2005; Sabherwal and Choudhury 2006; White and Lui 2005).  
Control is the mechanism through which the client ensures that the vendor performs adequately. This could be 
achieved both through output control (e.g., through checking the quality of the software solution provided by the 
vendor) and behavior control (e.g., through observing how the onshore or offshore personnel of the vendor is 
actually performing their work) (Eisenhardt 1985 ; Kirsch 1997; Ouchi 1979). Both activities lead to control 
costs for the client.  
Coordination costs are the costs for integrating and linking together client and vendor resources to accomplish 
the collective task of software development or maintenance (based on Van de Ven et al. 1976, p. 322). This 
includes the distribution of work across project members, ensuring that every team member knows how her or 
his work is related to the work of other team members. Proper procedures and infrastructure must also be 
available for exchange between the members of the offshore project, including client personnel and onshore and 
offshore staff of the vendor. Closely related to the notion of coordination – as defined in this study – is the 
concept of cooperation which has also been suggested to be different from control (White and Lui 2005). 
Cooperation captures the necessity of “social integration” that is “(…) necessary in order for partners to 
combine resources and integrate their activities in the course of undertaking a joint task.” (White and Lui 2005, 
p. 914). Thus, if the client has to invest in team building for social integration between client and vendor staff 
(Das and Teng 2001), this would be an indication of high cooperation, i.e. coordination costs.  
“In human systems, on the other hand, the motivations, incentives, and emotions of people are often 
extremely complex, and understanding them is usually an important part of coordination” (Malone and 
Crowston 1994, p. 91). 
 
Having categorized and defined the types of extra costs that may arise in offshored software projects (research 
question 1), we will theorize on the drivers of variations in the magnitude of extra costs between different 
offshored software projects (research question 2). We will do so by deriving propositions from two 
complementary theoretical perspectives: TCE and KBV. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics  
The roots of TCE date back to Coase (1937) who argued that firms exist because using the market is costly. This 
basic argument has been picked up by Williamson (1975; 1985) in his development of TCE. The main objective 
of TCE is to identify the conditions under which market governance (e.g., outsourcing) is more cost efficient 
than governance within the boundaries of a firm (i.e., insourcing).  
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“The main hypothesis out of which transaction cost economics works is this: Firms seek to align 
transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which differ in their costs and 
competencies, in a discriminating (mainly transaction costs economizing) way” (Williamson 1991, p. 79, 
italics original). 
 
Thus, the main focus of TCE is on minimizing transaction costs, which can be defined as all costs in terms of 
time, effort, and money spent, that arise for “(…) planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under 
alternative governance structures” (Williamson 1981 p. 552f.). The notion of planning and adapting refers to 
pre-contractual activities as well as contract adaptations (see Figure 3), which are not the focus of our study. The 
concept of monitoring, however, is reflected by the concept of control. Accordingly, we will subsequently use 
the term control equally to that of transaction costs. According to TCE, the existence of control costs is based on 
two fundamental behavioral assumptions. First, it is assumed that economic actors are boundedly rational 
(based on Simon 1957). Accordingly, contracts can only be settled incompletely since “(…) it is impossible to 
deal with complexity in all contractually relevant aspects” (Williamson 1981, p. 554). The incompleteness of 
contracts would not matter if the contractual partners were completely trustworthy (“stewardship behavior,” 
Williamson 1975, p. 26). This, however, is ruled out by a second assumption. It is assumed that some actors 
behave opportunistically, which means that they cunningly take advantage of opportunities at the expense of 
others – also referred to as “(...) self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson 1981, p. 554). It is assumed that it 
is hard, or indeed impossible, to anticipate another person’s attitude towards opportunism, which likely leads to 
opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1985, p. 64). Accordingly, control costs arise in order to safeguard against 
opportunistic behavior of an exchange partner.  
The effort for safeguarding against such vendor opportunism, however, is not meant to be constant across any 
type of market transaction (i.e., outsourcing relationship). Transaction costs are proposed to depend on various 
contingencies, such as asset specificity, site specificity, uncertainty, and frequency (Williamson, 1981). From 
these four contingencies, asset specificity was found to have the most consistent explanatory power in a wide 
range of empirical applications of TCE. This was confirmed both in reviews of non-IS disciplines (Rindfleisch 
and Heide 1997), as well as in a specific literature review on studies of IS outsourcing (Dibbern et al. 2004). 
Furthermore, the empirical validity of TCE was found to be particularly high when asset specificity was 
operationalized in terms of human asset specificity rather than physical or technological specificity. In contrast, 
the impact of uncertainty was found to be very limited, i.e. inconsistent (Dibbern et al. 2004; Rindfleisch and 
Heide 1997). Site specificity appears to be relevant in physical production settings; while frequency has rarely 
been investigated – presumably because this would require the observation of transactions over time, which is 
very demanding to achieve in empirical studies. 
This study therefore focuses on human asset specificity as the main predictor variable from TCE. Human assets 
refer to special characteristics of the actual professionals that are involved in developing and maintaining 
software applications. In particular, they refer to different kinds of knowledge sets that are required to perform 
an activity. According to Williamson (1981, p. 563), it is the nature of knowledge that matters when 
differentiating between highly and less specific human assets. Applied to the IS outsourcing context, human 
asset specificity may hence be referred to as client-specific knowledge6, i.e. the degree to which the 
development or maintenance work of a software project requires a significant amount of understanding of and 
knowledge about unique work procedures and business processes as well as unique software systems of the 
client organization (Beath and Walker 1998; Dibbern et al. 2005). If the provision of an IS function requires 
knowledge that is very client-specific, the vendor has to invest a lot of time and resources in order to adopt this 
unique knowledge. The vendor therefore has to make a client-specific investment. According to TCE, this 
necessity increases the vendor’s propensity to behave opportunistically, because such a specific investment 
would prevent the vendor from realizing economies of scale by using the same resources (employees and 
adopted knowledge) in alternative production scenarios, i.e. with other customers. Opportunistic behavior could 
for example take the form of under-investing in the project or using employees that were contracted for the 
client in other vendor accounts without informing the client. This behavior could result in low service and 
product quality (i.e., poor software quality) or project delays (Barney 1999, p. 139). In order to safeguard 
against opportunistic behavior and its negative consequences, the client would invest in constantly monitoring 
both the vendor’s process of software development and maintenance as well as the output (e.g., by checking the 
quality of the vendor’s functional specifications or software design, as well as intermediary releases or 
prototypes). This leads to increased control costs.  
                                                          
6 Related concepts are context-specific knowledge (Sabherwal and Becerra-Fernandez 2005) as well as 
knowledge specificity (Choudhury and Sampler 1997). 
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Complementary to control, the client could increase its coordination effort. As said before, control and 
coordination are interrelated. Coordination enables control and vice versa (Kumar and Seth 1998). Higher 
investments into coordination could reduce the vendor’s propensity towards opportunism. A number of authors 
have suggested that trust may serve as an antipode of opportunism (e.g., Chiles and McMackin 1996; Ghoshal 
and Moran 1996; e.g., Joshi and Stump 1999; Noorderhaven 1996). Chiles and McMackin (1996, p. 88) 
conclude that the “(...) inclusion of the social-context variable of trust in the TCE framework will yield a model 
with greater predictive validity.” As coordination increases the level of trust between client and vendor 
personnel, the possibility of opportunistic behavior is reduced (Ouchi 1980, p. 134). This is particularly likely 
when the client invests in cooperation enhancing activities, such as team building and socializing between client 
and vendor personnel. Notably, this form of coordination has also been referred to as “clan control” (Ouchi 
1979). It focuses on developing “(…) shared values, beliefs, and goals among members so that appropriate 
behaviors will be reinforced and rewarded” (Das and Teng 2001, p. 259). Since the threat of opportunistic 
behavior is conceivably high in cases of high asset specificity, i.e. when a lot of client-specific knowledge is 
required for the development and maintenance work, coordination costs are expected to increase. It is important 
to note that the argument is not that client-specific knowledge leads to more opportunistic behavior, but rather 
that in case of high asset specificity vendor opportunistic behavior leads to more extra costs. This observation 
leads to the following propositions: 
Proposition 1a, b: The higher the level of required client-specific knowledge in an offshored software project, 
the higher are the client’s costs for (a) control and (b) coordination in order to safeguard against the threat and 
presence of opportunistic behavior of the vendor. 
 
Knowledge-based View of the Firm 
The knowledge-based view (KBV) is a theoretical perspective originating from the resource-based view (RBV) 
of the firm (Grant 1996). Based on the RBV, which views the firm as a collection of productive resources 
(Barney 1991; Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt 1984), the KBV considers knowledge as the critical input in production 
and as the primary source of value of the firm (Grant 1996, p. 112). Based on the assumption of “bounded 
rationality”, this view concludes that “(…) cognitive limitations prohibit individuals from possessing identical 
stocks of knowledge” (Conner and Prahalad 1996, p. 478). Since each organization has its unique set of human 
resources, it follows that each organization possesses a unique repository of knowledge, thus leading to 
knowledge asymmetry between firms. Accordingly, it has been argued that the vertical boundaries of firms 
“(…) may be analyzed in terms of relative efficiency of knowledge utilization” (Grant 1996, p. 119).  
The explicit consideration of the economic implications of knowledge asymmetries between organizations goes 
beyond TCE, which assumes that the firm and the market have access to the same input factors and can create 
the same outputs (Conner 1991, p. 142; Demsetz 1988, p. 164; Williamson 1992, p. 339). Indeed, the KBV of 
the firm is based on the assumption that under certain conditions activities that require the integration of 
knowledge from different sources can more efficiently be performed within the boundaries of the firm.  
“Firms exist because they can more efficiently coordinate collective learning than market organization is 
able to do” (Fransman 1994, p. 186). 
 
In particular, if organization-specific knowledge is required to perform a task, using the external market 
becomes increasingly inefficient since an external supplier would first have to adopt this knowledge before 
being able to perform the task. Transferred to the IS offshoring context, this means that the client effort for 
transferring knowledge to an external vendor is particularly high if the required knowledge to perform the 
software development and maintenance work is highly client-specific (see Choudhury and Sampler 1997, p. 36).  
In order to compensate for the loss of value in transferring highly specific knowledge, the client may take over 
more and more of the specification (or even design) and at the same time increase the scope of specification, so 
that that the vendor is partially released from the challenge of understanding the client’s unique business 
processes and infrastructure (Mirani 2007). This process of knowledge substitution, however, is proposed to be 
inefficient when highly specific knowledge is involved, since it is difficult to externalize such tacit knowledge 
(Conner and Prahalad 1996, p. 478). This results in the following two propositions which are complementary to 
TCE: 
Proposition 2a, b: The higher the level of required client-specific knowledge in an offshored software project, 
the higher are the client’s costs for (a) knowledge transfer and (b) specification/design. 
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It can also be argued that if a high level of client-specific knowledge is required in a software project, control 
and coordination costs may increase for the client, independent of the threat or presence of opportunistic 
behavior of the vendor (Conner 1991; Conner and Prahalad 1996; Foss 1993). Critics of TCE have argued that 
in many situations the vendor may not afford to behave opportunistically, because “(…) over the long run, the 
invisible hand [market mechanism] deletes actors who are habitually opportunistic” (Hill 1990, p. 503). 
Opportunistic behavior may destroy the vendor’s reputation for a long time and prevent the vendor from 
conducting ongoing business with the client (Fama 1980, p. 505). 
While TCE argues that transaction costs would be non-existent in the absence of opportunism, the KBV of the 
firm holds that there may be situations where knowledge transfer between client and vendor is necessary but 
difficult to achieve. In case of high knowledge specificity, the vendor may struggle to deliver the expected 
product or service – simply because it lacks the client-specific knowledge. The consequence would be that the 
client spends a lot of effort for constantly monitoring the process and product quality of the vendor. Moreover, if 
knowledge about idiosyncratic client resources (including business processes and/or software systems) is 
required, there is often a high level of project uncertainty, both regarding the required inputs to the project (e.g., 
requirements and amount of resources) as well as the output of the process (e.g., the quality of the software) 
(Nidumolu 1995). A vast amount of control and coordination is therefore necessary to ensure adequate service 
and product quality (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003) in spite of the absence of opportunistic vendor behavior 
(Conner and Prahalad 1996). Accordingly, the following two rival propositions to TCE are put forth: 
Proposition 3a, b: The higher the level of required client-specific knowledge in an offshored software project, 
the higher are the client’s costs for (a) control and (b) coordination independent of the presence or threat of 
opportunistic behavior of the vendor. 
Both propositions 2 and 3 are implicitly based on the assumption that external vendors generally lack client-
specific knowledge and have equal capabilities to absorb that knowledge. This, however, contradicts the basic 
assumption of the KBV that firms generally differ in their resources and capacities. In line with evolutionary 
theory, a firm can be conceptualized as a bundle of routines and as a historical entity whose productive 
knowledge is the result of an experience-based learning process (Nelson and Winter 1982). Since all firms go 
through different learning processes, they are able to develop distinctive capabilities and identities (Knudsen 
1995). Considering that offshore vendors generally differ in their prior experiences, their ability to absorb client-
specific knowledge likely varies.  
Absorptive capacity reflects the “(…) ability to utilize outside knowledge” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, p. 128). 
This capacity, which is also referred to as “creativity capacity”, (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, p. 131) “(…) is 
largely a function of the level of prior related knowledge” (p. 128). In software development and maintenance 
projects, prior knowledge means having gained experience in similar projects – ideally with the same customer, 
the same technology and the same type of business processes (Gopal et al. 2002; Gopal et al. 2003). Thus, if the 
absorptive capacity of a vendor is low, knowledge transfer costs will likely increase for the client. In a like vein, 
specification costs will increase in the absence of vendor absorptive capacity, since the client may prefer to take 
over part of the specification himself, therefore increasing costs. Finally, control and coordination costs as a 
result of knowledge asymmetry will also decrease with a higher level of absorptive capacity of the vendor. 
Accordingly, the following effect is proposed. 
Proposition 4: The higher the level of absorptive capacity of the vendor, the lower are the client’s extra costs.  
As noted before, prior experiences are particularly important if there is a high need for absorbing client-specific 
knowledge, which is the case in particular if a software project requires a high amount client-specific 
knowledge. However, even if absorptive capacity is high, extra costs may still arise to a certain extent if very 
idiosyncratic knowledge has to be adopted by the vendor. That is, the negative impact of vendor absorptive 
capacity on client extra costs will be weaker as the degree of required client-specific knowledge increases. This 
moderating impact of asset specificity on the effect of absorptive capacity (Proposition 5) is illustrated in Table 
2. 
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Table 2. Interaction Between Client-specific Knowledge and Absorptive Capacity  
  Degree of client-specific knowledge 
  High Medium Low 
High Medium level of extra costs 
Low-Medium level of 
extra costs 
Low level of extra 
costs 
Medium Medium-high level of extra costs 
Medium level of extra 
costs 
Low-medium level 
of extra costs 
Level of absorptive 
capacity of vendor 
Low High level of extra 
costs 
Medium-high level of 
extra costs 
Medium level of 
extra costs 
 
Proposition 5: The negative impact of vendor absorptive capacity on client extra costs will be moderated by 
level of required client-specific knowledge. 
 
Impact of Offshore-specific Factors 
Offshore outsourcing, as compared to domestic outsourcing, brings about unique challenges. Those challenges 
may arise from cultural differences (Krishna et al. 2004; Rao 2004), geographic distance (Carmel and Agarwal 
2002; Rao 2004) and languages barriers (Apte 1990; Rao 2004; Zatolyuk and Allgood 2004) between the client 
and the vendor country. Furthermore, time zone differences as well as specific institutional features of offshore 
countries, such as infrastructure, security, political conditions and intellectual property regulations within the 
offshore country have to be taken into account when entering and managing an offshore outsourcing 
arrangement (Apte 1990; Hirschheim et al. 2005; Rao 2004; Rottman and Lacity 2004). All these challenges are 
offshore-specific because they result from the fact that the vendor is located in a country or geographical region 
different from that of the client organization. Each of these factors implies a certain type of distance between 
client and vendor. Thus, taken together, they may be referred to as different categories of offshore-specific 
client-vendor distance measurers (Carmel and Agarwal 2001; Gopal et al. 2003; Heeks et al. 2001; Kliem 2004; 
Krishna et al. 2004; Nicholson and Sahay 2001).  
From these offshore-specific factors, the first three, namely cultural and geographic distance as well as 
languages barriers, can directly affect the quality and ease of interaction between client and vendor. The most 
obvious challenges are language barriers (Rao 2004). If client and vendor speak different languages, 
communication becomes difficult. This hampers knowledge transfer between client and vendor and increases 
the likelihood of false specification due to misunderstandings (Apte 1990). Similarly, control and coordination 
costs will likely increase, since they rely on effective communication which is aggravated through language 
differences.  
In terms of geographic distance it may be argued that communication technologies, such as video conferencing 
and e-mail and groupware tools that support virtual collaborative work, increasingly substitute the need for 
physical presence (Clemons et al. 1993). However, considering the nature of software development and 
maintenance as social actions, physical meetings are still an issue (Apte 1990; Cramton and Webber 2005; 
Olson and Olson 2000). This is particularly true if a high amount of firm-specific knowledge is involved. This 
often requires the transfer of tacit knowledge, e.g. if knowledge about unique business processes needs to be 
adopted by the vendor. Tacit knowledge is best acquired through a process of socialization (Nonaka 1994) via 
face-to-face meetings (Nonaka and Konno 1998); the same applies to specification tasks. Specification requires 
a process of externalization where tacit knowledge is codified in form of functional requirements which then 
need to be internalized by the software designers and programmers. Again, these processes frequently require 
socializing action between client and vendor personnel (Scarbrough 1998). Geographic distance makes such 
face-to-face meetings more difficult and costly, which may increase extra costs.  
Finally, cultural distance can increase information acquisition costs (Kogut and Singh 1988) and hence increase 
the cost for all processes where information exchange is required. Cultural distance may be broken down into 
two components. Basically, cultural differences refer to the extent to which the members of two distinct groups 
(such as client and vendor personnel from different countries) differ on one or more cultural dimensions, i.e. 
their shared values, norms, beliefs and assumptions that help them organize and structure the world (based on 
Roberts and Wasti 2002, p. 545). These shared norms and values of a social group serve as generally accepted 
patterns of behavior and hence influence the behavior of the members of a social group (Keller 1982, p. 117; 
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Murdock 1940, p. 366). Accordingly, culturally affected behavioral differences or clashes may be observed 
when two cultural groups work together, as is the case in offshore outsourcing. Case studies on offshoring from 
Anglo-American countries to India, for example, indicate that opposing attitudes towards authority, hierarchy, 
and power may cause differences in criticism and feedback behavior between client and vendor personnel 
(Heeks et al. 2001, p. 57; Krishna et al. 2004, p. 65; Nicholson and Sahay 2001, p. 36). These culturally induced 
differences in the behavior of the offshore vendor necessitate costly counter reactions of the client, such as 
increased specification effort for avoiding misunderstandings at the vendor side, increased effort for knowledge 
transfer, more control effort for uncovering misunderstandings early on in the process, and increased 
coordination effort for enabling and ensuring smooth communication and interaction.7 This leads to the 
following proposition:  
Proposition 6: Offshore-specific client-vendor distance due to cultural differences, geographic distance and 
languages barriers increases the level of extra costs for the client. 
The client’s increase in extra costs due to offshore-specific distance between client and vendor, however, may 
not be similar in all offshored software projects. In projects where little direct interaction between client and 
vendor personnel is needed, cultural differences, geographic distance and language differences may not be a 
large issue. This is particularly likely if little client-specific knowledge is required by the offshore vendor. 
Accordingly, the following moderating impact of client-specific knowledge is proposed:  
Proposition 7: The impact of distance in culture, geographic location, and language between client and vendor 
on the level of client extra costs is higher in software projects that require a high level of client-specific 
knowledge. 
Institutional differences will not be factored into our theoretical frame. These differences include factors such as 
legal differences or political stability. Since these factors play a particularly important role for contracting or 
vendor/country choice, rather than for the actual service delivery, they will not be further considered for this 
study. As far as knowledge about legal systems and regulations of the client country is concerned, this should be 
captured by the notion of absorptive capacity.  
 
Research Methodology  
For scrutinizing the theoretical framework on extra costs, a multiple case study approach was chosen (Miles and 
Huberman 1994; Stake 2006; Yin 2003). This approach seemed to be particularly appropriate for answering our 
main research questions on “how” and “why” extra costs differ between offshored software projects (Benbasat 
et al. 1987; Yin 2003).  
The utilization of the case research methodology follows a widely recognized positivist research approach 
which intends to provide valuable insights into proposed interactions (Dubé and Paré 2003). The testing of a 
priori specified propositions is not meant to imitate a survey based procedure where the objective is to gather as 
many data points as possible for each variable of the theoretical model in order to increase the statistical 
generalizability across a larger population (“sampling logic”, Yin 2003, p. 48). Rather, the objective of the 
chosen multiple case study approach is to treat each case as a separate test of the theoretical frame in order to 
achieve an “analytic generalization” of our model (Yin 2003, p. 32) in which previously developed theory is 
used as a template that will be compared against the empirical results of the case studies. In this context, the 
generalizability will be achieved through “replication logic” in which each case is comparable to a new 
experiment. 
Due to the fact that the constructs and relationships would have been difficult to access in a quantitative manner, 
the case study approach was deemed particularly appropriate for examining the theoretical frame. This is 
particularly true for the dimensions “extra costs” and “cultural distance”. While it may have been possible to ask 
respondents of client organizations to estimate the amount of time spent for activities such as knowledge 
transfer or specification, an approach that does not force respondents into pre-specified dimensions, but rather 
allows for the importance of each dimension to emerge from the analysis and interpretation of the respondents’ 
                                                          
7  The direct impact of cultural distance on cost add-ons is consistent with previous literature that examined 
the moderating link of cultural differences on the relationship between asset specificity and low as opposed to 
high control modes in foreign investments (Erramilli and Rao 1993; Gatignon and Anderson 1988). In these 
studies, it was argued that cultural differences increase the information acquisition costs in monitoring and 
coordination which influence the firm’s propensity towards low versus high control modes in foreign countries. 
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epilogues and statements about problems, difficulties and extra effort that they experienced during the offshore 
endeavor was preferred (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 213). The qualitative approach also left room for theory 
extension in an exploratory manner through identifying the underlying issues and themes of broadly defined 
constructs such as “cultural distance” as well as for identifying additional constructs that may complement the 
original framework (e.g., Brown 1997)8. 
 
Sampling and Data Collection 
A purposeful sampling strategy was pursued in order to stay in line with the research objectives and the multiple 
case study design (Quinn Patton 2002). In order to control for potential bias of organizational culture (Hofstede 
1980), a single research site was chosen which represents a German-based internationally operating financial 
services provider with several years of experience with both domestic and offshore outsourcing. For reasons of 
anonymity, this organization is named FINANCE. Together with two top management representatives of 
FINANCE that are responsible for the firm’s organization-wide offshore strategy, six projects were selected 
from a database of the company’s sourcing management unit. To increase homogeneity and comparability 
between the projects, the projects were required to fulfill the following criteria: 
• only non-captive offshore projects with Indian vendors, 
• only ongoing projects that were initiated at around the same time, 
• only projects with approximately the same size, 
• only projects that were organized similarly, in that a combination of onsite and offshore presence of the 
vendor was agreed in the contract. 
 
The projects, i.e. cases, were chosen for enabling theoretical and literal replications (Yin 2003, p. 47). In order 
to ensure theoretical replication, at least two projects with high extra costs, and two projects with relatively low 
extra costs were included. The perceived overall economic success of the projects from the perspective of top 
management representatives were used as an initial approximate value for the overall level of extra costs in each 
project. Each group of projects could then be used for literal replication by examining whether projects with the 
same level of extra costs showed the same theoretically proposed conditions. This selection procedure resulted 
in six offshore projects with Indian vendors (three software development and three maintenance projects). An 
overview of the projects is provided in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8  Ideally, any theory building attempts from case studies should be unbiased by a priori theoretical 
perspectives or propositions (Eisenhardt 1989). However, in our study we thought to combine the merits of a 
theory testing with a theory building approach in the same spirit in which it is proposed as useful to combine 
positivist with interpretive approaches when studying organizational phenomena (Cavaye 1996; Lee 1991). This 
dual approach is consistent with the multiple case study analysis procedure: “In either approach [inductive or 
deductive], the initial version [causal network or theory] is amended and refined as it is tested against empirical 
events and characteristics.” (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 155).  
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Table 3. Descriptive Case Data 
 FRONTEND (Development) CORPORATEPAY (Development) 
Project description One part of a large-scale project 
encompassing the re-engineering of 
FINANCE’s current account system. This 
system was the firm’s largest and most 
important IT system. The purpose of the re-
engineering was to consolidate two systems 
into one new system in order to eliminate 
redundancy, reduce maintenance complexity, 
and lower the dependency on a few key 
people. 
Development of a European billing system for 
high value payments of corporate customers. 
This system enabled the business unit to bill 
their corporate customers with flexible 
conditions, for example multi-tier conditions or 
rebates.  
Contract Fixed price Fixed price 
Resources 
(onsite/offshore) 
Transition: 2/0 (client), 6/0 (Indian vendor), 
2/0 (German vendor) 
Delivery: 2/0 (client), 2/5 (Indian vendor) 
Transition: 1/0 (client), 6/0 (Indian vendor) 
Delivery: 1/temporarily several developers 
(client), 0/6 (Indian vendor) 
Quality issues Yes (lower quality than expected) Yes (lower quality than expected) 
Client extra costs High High 
 WEBPORT (Development) INTERCHANGE (Maintenance) 
Project description Development of a financial portal by two 
vendors. A German vendor was responsible 
for the business requirements analysis while 
an Indian vendor took over design, coding 
and testing. The portal to be developed was 
meant to provide information about capital 
market products for corporate customers. 
Maintenance and support of a legacy payment 
platform for domestic and cross border 
payments. The software realized conversion 
services for high value and bulk payments. First, 
it was decided to offshore only the testing of that 
application, but later on the whole maintenance 
and support was handed over to the same 
vendor. 
Contract Fixed price Fixed price 
Resources 
(onsite/offshore) 
Transition: 3/0 (client), 3/0 (Indian vendor), 
5/0 (German vendor) 
Delivery: 3/0 (client), 1/20 (Indian vendor), 
3/0 (external German consultants)  
Transition: 7/0 (client), 3/0 (Indian vendor), 4/0 
(external German consultants) 
Delivery: 7/0 (client), 3/12 (Indian vendor), 2/0 
(external German consultants) 
Quality issues Yes (lower quality than expected) Yes (lower quality than expected) 
Client extra costs Medium – low Medium – high  
 SUBSIDPAY (Maintenance) CORPACCESS (Maintenance) 
Project description Maintenance and support of a software 
package that ensured the bulk payment 
processing in one of the European 
subsidiaries. The application processed 
transactions for local clearing procedures, i.e. 
credit orders and direct debits. The core 
product was a U.S: standard software that 
was significantly enhanced and customized 
for the needs and requirements of the firm. 
Maintenance of two of the main applications 
regarding electronic payments processing for 
corporate customers which was previously 
outsourced domestically. One system realized 
the customer access, while the other one enabled 
the customer administration. 
Contract Fixed price Time and material 
Resources 
(onsite/offshore) 
Transition: 3/0 (client), 9/0 (Indian vendor) 
Delivery: 3/0 (client), 0/8 (Indian vendor) 
Transition: 1/0 (client), 6/0 (Indian vendor) 
Delivery: 1/0 (client), 2/5 (Indian vendor) 
Quality issues Yes (lower quality as compared to in-house 
maintenance) 
No 
Client extra costs Medium – high Low 
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In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the offshore outsourcing projects and to avoid key informant bias 
(Kumar et al. 1993), we followed a multiple informants design involving key members of each project (Miles 
and Huberman 1994; Yin 2003). We interviewed several stakeholders of each project: the project manager, one 
or two team members (from the client team), at least one member from the vendor’s team (onsite coordinator, 
relationship manager or offshore coordinator) and also involved process owners (business responsibles) 
wherever possible. The interviews were based on interview guidelines with semi-structured, open-ended 
questions, including questions about general project information as well as questions regarding the constructs of 
our theoretical framework. The interview guidelines were tailored to the different roles that the interviewees had 
in the projects. A high-level interview guideline is provided in Appendix C. In total, 27 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted by the first author and a research scholar. The interviews were open-ended and took 
between one and three hours. Most interviews were approximately two hours in length. The interview language 
was German for all FINANCE interviewees (except for one project manager with Spanish background) and 
English for all vendor interviewees. All interviews were face-to-face, except for one interview with an offshore 
project leader which took place via conference call to India. Table 4 provides an overview of the projects and 
the corresponding interviewees.  
Table 4. Overview of Projects and Interviewees 
1 = number of interviewees; - = not available for interview; N/A = not applicable, i.e. this role did not exist 
Development Maintenance     Projects 
Interviewees FRONTEND CORPORATEPAY WEBPORT INTERCHANGE SUBSIDPAY CORPACCESS 
Project 
manager 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Team  
member 1 1 N/A 1 1 1 
Vendor 2 1 1 1 1 2 
Business 
responsible 3 - 2 1 - 1 
 
Data Analysis Procedure 
All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. The transcripts from the 27 interviews were aggregated into 
a case protocol which comprised 198,996 words and 225 pages of text. The projects were encoded and 
structured using the software NVivo. The coding procedure was done as follows: first, in order to mitigate 
potential bias, the second author who had not taken part in the interviews read and coded the interview 
transcripts by identifying text passages that included information about the constructs of the theoretical 
framework. This process resulted in a table of 285 text passages and 348 codings since some of the citations 
provided information about more than one particular dimension. A new construct “vendor personnel turnover” 
emerged as an important theme throughout the process of data collection and analysis. It represents an additional 
vendor characteristic that influences extra costs and hence was incorporated into our framework in an 
exploratory manner.9 Following the coding of the second author, the first author likewise coded the transcripts. 
The comparison of the two codings resulted in an average inter-coder reliability of 85% according to Holsti 
(1969). The two coders then examined the mismatched coding and agreed on a final coding matrix that was used 
for the data analysis. The reasons for mismatches were always very obvious (e.g., in that one coder had simply 
overseen an issue within a statement). Only in two cases the third author was called in as a referee.  
For the purpose of literal and theoretical replication, the instances of the theoretical constructs were determined 
for each project whenever possible, e.g. for the constructs “required client-specific knowledge” and “level of 
extra costs” (high, medium, low). This will be shown in detail in the chapter ‘Case Findings’ and section 
‘Explaining Variations in Extra Costs’. In order to increase the validity of our coding and data analysis 
procedure, we aggregated multiple sources of evidence (Yin 2003), i.e. multiple citations from different 
stakeholders to determine whether a construct was rated high, medium or low. Moreover, we attempted to 
                                                          
9  High employee turnover has been reported as a challenge of offshoring in previous research (Carmel and 
Tija 2005; Lewin and Peeters 2006), but we did not anticipate it as having such a significant effect on our costs 
categories. 
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increase internal validity by not only performing pattern matching between variables but also by considering 
statements that by themselves included causal linkages (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 144)  
At this point, it needs to be noted that for examining the linkage between offshore-specific client-vendor 
distance and extra costs, as well as for analyzing the interaction effect with client-specific knowledge, we had to 
mostly rely on statements by the respondents that explained the interaction between these dimensions. This is 
due to the fact that only offshore projects from Germany to India were examined and hence there was no 
externally caused variation in the explanatory constructs “language barrier”, “cultural distance”, and 
“geographic distance”. Accordingly, no truly literal and theoretical replication logic was applicable for these 
relationships. Nevertheless, consistent themes emerged from our analysis about the impact of these dimensions 
on extra costs across the projects.  
 
Results 
Level of Extra Costs  
A first look at the case data revealed that client extra costs were incurred in all of the projects to a certain extent. 
During the interviews, however, it already became clear that the actual amount of time and resources that were 
required by the client for knowledge transfer, specification/design, controlling and coordinating was not 
rigorously and consistently tracked by FINANCE. The business and project managers, for example, had no 
records of the number of hours per day or week they invested for supporting the vendor personnel.  
“…the time that we invest, what we have provided as an input from the business side – we had 
days with more than 14, 15, 16 hours of work – are not taken into account.” (Business 
responsible, WEBPORT) 
“A business case was calculated as part of the sourcing strategy. However, from a business 
perspective, the impact has never been validated.” (Business manager, FRONTEND) 
“We made our business case, but nobody has paid attention to this business case ever again. […] 
We assume that what we have calculated or thought is what comes out at the end. Nobody is 
doing the tracking.“ (Project manager, INTERCHANGE) 
We estimated the level of extra costs for each project based on our interview data. In doing so we first searched 
for statements about the extent to which the business case of each project was met, resulting in a total number of 
55 business case related quotes. This data gave us a first estimate of the economic success of the projects. The 
majority of these quotes clearly indicates that extra costs were largely underestimated by FINANCE, regardless 
of the method that was used to set up the business cases. This is exemplified by the following quotes:  
• “We had a budget increase, since FINANCE employees had to support the vendor at times when the vendor 
should have been working things out on their own.” (Business responsible, FRONTEND) …“The result was 
that the assumption in the business case that the vendor would do 60% of the work turned out to be the 
other way around, 70% FINANCE and 30% vendor.” (Business responsible, FRONTEND) 
• “We needed three more people from our side.” (Project manager, CORPORATEPAY) 
• “Apparently, we have to invest more time. And time is money.” (Business responsible, WEBPORT) 
• “Our engagement and commitment is very high. And without this special commitment, this professionalism 
and this technical know-how, it would not have been possible.” (Project manager, INTERCHANGE) 
• “Extra costs were incurred during the set-up phase.” (Project manager, SUBSIDPAY) 
 
One important additional information is the extent to which the client was satisfied with the quality of the 
vendor performance (in particular software, i.e. solution quality); as long as the quality had not yet met the 
client’s expectations, the project continued on, surpassing deadlines and creating additional costs related to 
managing the vendor (see Table 3). To elaborate on (i.e., isolate) the actual extra costs of each project, we 
analyzed the specific statements on costs for knowledge transfer, specification and design, control, and 
coordination. Examples from the cases are provided in Table 5.  
 
 
  
18 
 
Table 5. Extra Costs 
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER  
Case Exemplified Quotes 
FRONTEND “We have to do an enormous amount of knowledge transfer. Somebody from here would 
already have this knowledge.” (Team member) 
CORPORATEPAY “The knowledge transfer was very intense.” (Project manager) 
INTERCHANGE “My team members, my German colleagues, are saying, I have to repeat something one 
hundred times to the team members, why does the knowledge transfer not happen?” (Project 
manager) 
SUBSIDPAY “We had to explain the same things again and again where we would have expected them to 
explain things among themselves.” (Team member) 
SPECIFICATION 
FRONTEND “They will still need someone from our side to help them consider what the front end could 
look like […] or what the problems could be.” (Business responsible) 
CORPORATEPAY “The requirements have to be very precise. […] So in the end, we have done most of the 
work.” (Project manager) 
WEBPORT “You have to specify precisely what is required or needs to be done.” (Project manager) 
INTERCHANGE “You have to tell them, please use this template. Do it like this.” (Project manager) 
SUBSIDPAY “We have to specify and pay attention to many more things.” (Team member) 
DESIGN 
FRONTEND “We have to contribute a lot more in order to balance certain deficits, e.g. conceptual 
deficits.” (Team member) 
CORPORATEPAY “Not only do they need a proof of trust, they also need professional support.” (Team 
member) 
VENDOR COORDINATION 
FRONTEND “Although we are not directly involved in the programming, we have to guide the project 
very closely, which is very time consuming.” (Business responsible) 
CORPORATEPAY “We manage the vendor, we allocate the work, and we take care of quality.” (Project 
manager) 
WEBPORT “I have to do a lot of coordination, otherwise things would not happen at all or in the wrong 
way.” (Project manager) 
“There is a lack of effective project management. Given that the vendor has the highest level 
[CMM] certification, it is unbelievable that I have to keep track of a project’s plan and status 
myself.” (Project manager) 
CONTROL 
FRONTEND “This is a controlling issue. Even though we don’t have to, we do a technical implementation 
in order to be able to evaluate whether the vendor’s solution is right or wrong.” (Business 
responsible) 
CORPORATEPAY “The vendor needs feedback: What went wrong? And why?” (Team member) 
WEBPORT “I am permanently pushing and advising them.” (Project manager) 
INTERCHANGE “Documentation, hands on sessions, flying over there, explaining them things, bringing 
people here, but at the end of the day, the only reasonable approach apart from all those 
things, you need more control and you need more dedication.” (Project manager) 
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Based on this analysis, authors one and two independently determined the level of extra costs (low, medium or 
high) for each project, with the third author serving as a referee in case of different classification (only two 
instances). This resulted in the following estimation of extra costs incurred in each case (Table 6): 
Table 6. Estimation of Extra Costs 
 FRONTEND CORPORATEPAY WEBPORT INTERCHANGE SUBSIDPAY CORPACCESS 
Total  high high low-medium medium-high medium-high low 
Knowledge 
transfer, 
specification 
and design  
high medium medium medium-high medium-high low 
Coordination 
and control low-medium high low-medium medium medium low 
 
In order to increase our confidence level in our base estimate, we performed a simple plausibility check. We 
counted the number of quotes for each project and cost category (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 213), divided by 
the number of total cost-related quotes and the number of interview participants for each project (see e.g. Sherif 
et al. 2006). Vendor interviews were not considered in this calculation, since the vendors’ team members could 
hardly provide information about additional effort that had to be incurred on the client side. This calculation is 
shown in Table 7.  
Table 7. Extra Costs (Number of Quotes) 
 FRONTEND CORPORATEPAY WEBPORT INTERCHANGE SUBSIDPAY CORPACCESS 
(1) Knowledge      
      Transfer 11 1 4 6 4 2 
(2) Specification 9 2 5 1 3 2 
(3) Design 10 1 1 1 0 0 
Total (1) + (2) + (3) 30 4 10 8 7 4 
Average 
(1) + (2) + (3)* 5,0 2,0 3,3 2,7 3,5 1,3 
(4) Coordination 4 4 2 3 2 2 
(5) Control 5 5 4 3 3 3 
Total (4) + (5) 9 9 6 6 5 5 
Average (4) + (5)* 1,5 4,5 2,0 2,0 2,5 1,7 
Total 39 13 16 14 12 9 
Average* 6,5 6,5 5,3 4,7 6,0 3,0 
* Average = Total number of quotes / Number of interviewed FINANCE employees 
 
(1) Frequency. As can be inferred from Table 7, the relative number of quotes for extra costs mostly 
corresponds with our estimate from the content analysis of the quotes. The projects FRONTEND and 
CORPORATEPAY show the highest number of quotes, followed by SUBSIDPAY. WEBPORT and 
INTERCHANGE are in the middle, while CORPACCESS ranks lowest. 
 
(2) Nature of costs. With regard to individual cost categories, the numbers show that costs for coordination 
and control, as well as costs for knowledge transfer and specification/design, occurred mostly in 
combination, except for INTERCHANGE where knowledge transfer was the dominant cost category. 
Furthermore, two different findings emerged from the counting: In the development project 
WEBPORT as well as in the maintenance projects INTERCHANGE, SUBSIDPAY and 
CORPACCESS, costs were incurred throughout the cost categories in a fairly equal way. In contrast, 
FRONTEND relied heavily on extra knowledge transfer and specification/design, while in 
CORPORATEPAY, extra costs for coordination and control were more frequently mentioned. Design 
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costs were mostly incurred in FRONTEND and occurred to a small extent in CORPORATEPAY, 
WEBPORT and INTERCHANGE.  
 
Taken together, our baseline estimate was largely met by our follow-up quantitative assessment, which 
increased our confidence that our estimate of extra costs was valid. Notably, at our final presentation at 
FINANCE, the project managers also agreed with our appraisal of the level of extra costs in each of the projects, 
increasing the external validity of our analysis. 
 
Explaining Variations in Extra Costs 
Having identified the level of extra costs in each project, the next question to answer is why these costs varied 
between the projects (research question 2). 
Impact of Required Client-specific Knowledge 
In the following, we analyze each of the projects with regard to the degree of required client-specific 
knowledge. Furthermore, we interpret the relation between the degree of required client-specific knowledge and 
the level of extra costs (Propositions 1, 2, 3). Table 8 exemplifies the classification of the degree of required 
client-specific knowledge for three of the projects. In line with Dibbern et al. (2005), required client-specific 
knowledge, i.e. asset specificity, was rated high when the development or maintenance work required 
knowledge about unique software applications and/or business processes of the client. In contrast, if the 
application service provision primarily required general technological knowledge (e.g., programming 
capabilities) or industry knowledge that can be acquired without close interaction with client personnel, the 
required client-specific knowledge was rated rather low. Moreover, in software reengineering and software 
maintenance projects, required client-specific knowledge was rated high when the client applications that were 
taken over by the vendor had a high level of historically grown complexity and if it was difficult to understand 
the underlying logic of the programming code. 
Table 8. Required Client-specific Knowledge 
Case Rating Quote 
FRONTEND 
(Development) 
High “Throughout the project, a great amount of business knowledge is needed. 
We touch a system that is older than 25 years, where a large number of 
business rules are implemented“ (Project manager) 
“It is a highly complex system. You will not be able to understand it 
immediately.” (Team member) 
WEBPORT 
(Development) 
Medium 
- low 
“This is a portal. This is a purely technical project, actually. It is more 
technology than functionality.” (Vendor) 
“As I said, you should have a basic knowledge about the data that is 
displayed. Beyond that, you are not expected to understand how the rates are 
calculated.” (Vendor) 
INTERCHANGE 
(Maintenance) 
Medium 
- high 
“The complexity we have is very high […] I would say, 60% of the 
knowledge was on the paper and the rest of it was in the people’s heads.” 
(Project manager) 
“The system is very complex. We have technical people, and we have people 
who contribute their knowledge for the business analysis part.” (Team 
member) 
 
From all projects, the re-engineering project FRONTEND turned out to be the one with the highest level of 
required client-specific knowledge. On the one hand, it required an excellent understanding of the two prior 
systems that were custom-built over a period of almost 30 years; few key persons possessed knowledge about 
the system and understood the structure. The system reflected business rules that even the business unit itself 
was not aware of anymore. Although the documentation was enormous, there were still gaps. The system was a 
unique application which reflected idiosyncratic organizational processes that needed to be understood by the 
vendor. Transformational business knowledge was needed since the new system should entail additional 
functionalities that went beyond the original twin-system. CORPORTEPAY is in second position with regard to 
required client-specific knowledge. It primarily required client-specific business knowledge and a very good 
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understanding of the banking market. Moreover, knowledge about FINANCE’s idiosyncratic IT landscape was 
needed for this project. INTERCHANGE was positioned in third place, rated medium-high in terms of required 
client-specific knowledge. The project started with handing over the testing to the vendor, followed by 
maintenance and support of a proprietary complex system reflecting processes that are unique to the bank. 
Although testing methodologies are generic and apply to all types of software, a certain amount of knowledge 
and understanding about the system’s structure and processes was required. For the maintenance task, detailed 
knowledge about firm specific processes and application flow was needed. Number four is SUBSIDPAY, also 
rated medium-high. The project involved the maintenance of a U.S. standard software which was extremely 
customized to a European subsidiary’s needs. Firm-specific processes were thus reflected in the application and 
therefore needed to be understood by the vendor. The actual maintenance task, however, only included minimal 
software upgrades and changes. The degree of required client-specific knowledge is therefore rated as medium. 
CORPACCESS ranks in fifth place, because little unique client knowledge was needed in this project; most of 
the process flows could be documented. The maintenance work load consisted of technical standard tasks, such 
as upgrades of the operation system version, the database version or the programming language version. For 
these tasks, general technical domain knowledge was required and some unique knowledge about the specific 
standards that were used in the bank. Accordingly, the degree of required client-specific knowledge of the 
outsourced tasks is rated medium. Lastly, WEBPORT was rated the lowest in terms of required client-specific 
knowledge. For this development project, very little organization-specific know-how was needed. For the 
requirements analysis phase the external vendor had to bring in knowledge about web portals in the business 
market and come up with some innovative design ideas. The software did not map any firm-specific process 
flows. Accordingly, among all outsourced projects to India, this one has the lowest degree of required client-
specific knowledge.  
Having positioned each project on the required client-specific knowledge continuum, the next step is to examine 
Propositions 1 to 3, i.e. whether projects with a higher level of required client-specific knowledge actually 
showed higher levels of extra costs. For this purpose, we created a simple contingency table crossing the two 
variables (“required client-specific knowledge” and “level of extra costs”) (Huberman and Miles 1994). This 
mapping is illustrated in Figure 4. As can be inferred from Figure 4, this logic largely applies to the projects, 
supporting our reasoning that a higher level of required client-specific knowledge leads to a higher level of extra 
costs for the client. Deviations to this logic, as it is the case for CORPACCESS, will be discussed in our further 
analysis. 
CORPORATEPAY
FRONTEND
WEBPORT
INTERCHANGE
CORPACCESS
SUBSIDPAY
low medium high
low
medium
high
Required client-specific knowledge
E
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Figure 4. Relationship Between Required Client-specific Knowledge and Extra Costs 
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The next question is to examine the more fine grained TCE logic (Proposition 1) as opposed to that of the KBV 
(Propositions 2 and 3). First, whether or not control and coordination costs arise for safeguarding against vendor 
opportunism when asset specificity is high (TCE) or whether they arise due to knowledge asymmetries between 
client and vendor (KBV) must be questioned. Interestingly, we initially could not find any conclusive evidence 
that coordination and control costs were particularly high due to safeguarding against vendor opportunistic 
behavior (Proposition 1). The vendor staff was perceived as highly motivated and willing to make the required 
client-specific investments, even in the two highly client-specific projects FRONTEND and 
CORPORATEPAY. The problem was that even though the vendor tried very hard, the software quality often 
did not meet the client’s expectations due the vendor personnel’s lack of understanding the client requirements 
as well as the underlying business and application logic. Accordingly, the client invested much more time in 
error detection and functionality checks than expected, which lead to higher control costs. When further 
examining the sources of the vendor’s inability to deliver high quality software without significant client 
support, we found there was one issue that may be viewed as a form of opportunistic behavior of the vendor: the 
project staffing management of the vendor. The client often complained about the lack of experiences of the 
vendor personnel (many of the team members came directly from university) as well as the high rate of 
personnel turnover (both issues will be taken up in detail in the next sections). It seemed that the vendor took 
little effort into staffing the projects with personnel with the right skill sets or in limiting the rate and the 
consequences of high turnover. This may be viewed as a form of opportunistic behavior, because the vendor 
should have informed the client about its problematic staffing situation before the contract was settled. The 
consequence was that the client eventually invested more time in the coordination of the project. To give an 
example: In one of the maintenance projects with medium-high asset specificity, the project manager 
complained about high coordination costs for finding skilled people that are motivated to stay in the project. The 
project manager put tremendous effort into getting highly skilled team members and motivating them to stay in 
the project. 
“It was a pain in the neck and I was selecting almost every team member, kept looking on their 
CVs, their experience, the way they react, the way they respond, whether they are serious or not, 
whether they are professional, whether they are too young people and not committed to this 
project […]. So I supervised the project very strictly.” (Project Manager, INTERCHANGE) 
Still, an increase in extra costs for control and coordination was observed in the case data for those projects with 
higher specificity (Proposition 3). As our estimates in Table 6 and Table 7 indicate, this holds true for most of 
the cases. In CORPORATEPAY, a very specific project, management made strong investments in additional 
coordination and control. They even changed the operating model and decided to regain the lead for all tasks 
except programming, which was still done in India: 
“We regained control, i.e. we now govern the vendor, we allocate the work and we take care of quality 
issues.” (Project manager, CORPORATEPAY) 
In terms of Proposition 2, there was clear evidence that knowledge transfer and specification/design costs were 
exceptionally high when client-specific knowledge was required to perform the development and maintenance 
work (see Table 6 and 7). The highly specific project FRONTEND illustrates the need to support the Indian 
vendor in terms of knowledge transfer, specification and design: 
“We also thought that the Indian professionals would be able to analyze the program with their tools 
on their own, and to acquire the business know-how with the help of these tools, but that is also not the 
case. They highly depend on our help.” (Project Manager, FRONTEND). 
Two cases show an exception to this logic: In INTERCHANGE, a lot of effort was mentioned for extra 
knowledge transfer, but very few statements referred to extra costs due to additional effort for providing 
specifications for the vendor. This may be explained by the fact that four external consultants were initially 
hired during the transition phase to develop detailed specifications. Therefore, the challenge for FINANCE was 
to transfer the knowledge of this rather specific project to the vendor as detailed specifications were already 
available. CORPORATEPAY provides another exception, since specificity in this project was very high, 
however, knowledge transfer and specification cost were comparably low. As mentioned above, 
CORPORATEPAY incurred a large amount of extra costs for coordination and control, so they heavily relied on 
this kind of management strategy rather than investing in additional knowledge integration. 
The findings illustrate that an increase in extra costs may be explained by the KBV logic as stated in Proposition 
2 and 3. By contrast, only little evidence was found for Proposition 1, which states that control and coordination 
costs arise solely for safeguarding against opportunistic vendor behavior.  
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Impact of Vendor-related Characteristics 
Lack of Absorptive Capacity. Another aspect which persistently appeared in the case study was a perceived 
inexperience of the vendors’ team members and their lack of creativity. Both were treated as indicators for the 
vendor personnel’s lack of absorptive capacity. Consistent with Proposition 4, inexperience of Indian team 
members led to higher knowledge transfer costs. Although the Indian vendor of FRONTEND had already 
worked with FINANCE in other projects, the German project manager realized the lack of domain-specific 
know-how and experience and additionally hired two German consultants that previously had worked with 
FINANCE for understanding and transferring the know-how of key resources. The two consultants’ support was 
perceived as very important and helpful by the FRONTEND project manager. The initial idea that the offshore 
vendor would be able to understand the existing applications landscape by using its own reengineering tools was 
misleading. Additional knowledge transfer was required to understand the highly specific application logic.  
In addition to higher knowledge transfer costs, the Indian vendors’ lack of absorptive capacity also lead to 
increased specification effort. Due to the Indian professionals’ lack of creativity and inexperience of young team 
members, the requirements specifications had to be very accurate for offshore outsourcing.  
 “I get the desired quality for clearly defined processes. This will be difficult or not achievable for 
work where I expect creativity from the [Indian supplier] firm.” (Project manager, SUBSIDPAY) 
“The business unit decided to develop a ‘storyboard’ as we realized: We had to add things so the 
Indian professionals were able to better understand things, because they didn’t ask questions. And 
if they asked questions it was obvious that they lacked understanding of the functionality of the 
webpage.” (Business manager, WEBPORT)  
Thus, in cases where knowledge transfer was difficult to achieve due to the vendor’s lack of absorptive capacity, 
the client invested in knowledge substitution by specifying requirements at a high level of detail. In other words, 
the client was forced to take over work that was originally covered by the contract and hence the responsibility 
of the vendor. Particularly in the highly client-specific project FRONTEND, the vendor was not able to deliver 
without some internal team members taking over tasks that were planned to be in the vendor’s responsibility. 
Internal team members did not only invest in requirements specification but also in software design far beyond 
of what had been expected. For FRONTEND, internal team members had to fly to India in order to help to 
execute the testing. In CORPORATEPAY, some design costs were incurred as well. Internal programmers were 
sent to India to have a look at the source code and to technically support the team. This additional support by the 
client was necessary because of the vendor’s inexperience and lack of required skill sets, i.e. absorptive 
capacity. 
“In my opinion, you have to work closely together and observe very closely what work is being 
done. And this is why the 40:60 [onsite : offshore] model is really hard to achieve. Because in my 
opinion, we have to contribute a lot more in order to balance certain deficits, e.g. conceptual 
deficits.” (Team member, FRONTEND) 
Increased coordination effort was another reaction of the client in responding to the vendor’s lack of absorptive 
capacity. As soon as the client realized how critical it was for the success of the project to have experienced 
project members at the vendor side, FINANCE felt the need to actively participate in the composition of the 
vendor’s team. This created extra effort, i.e. extra coordination costs. 
“Because of these difficulties we have to invest in team building, which we underestimated.” 
(Project Manager, FRONTEND) 
Control of a project’s progress is another important issue. CORPORATEPAY showed that outsourcing 
the analysis phase and not controlling the results of the design phase may lead to severe problems. Due to 
the vendor personnel’s lack of required business understanding, creativity, and experience, they often 
failed to fully grasp the business requirements and needs, which lead to increased control effort for the 
client. 
“It is not easy to work with the vendor because you have to control each of his steps very closely 
und you have to make sure that the vendor understands the specified criteria. These are issues 
that do not come up in this way with a European IT colleague.” (Business Manager, 
FRONTEND)  
”You need certain controlling on the deliverables and the way they work and the way they 
organize themselves. […] You have to control what they are doing and supervise the results, also 
the way they have done things. […] I think the big challenge in this type of project is: you cannot 
compare the knowledge of a person that has worked on the application of SUBSIDPAY since 10 
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years with the knowledge one consultant can gain in six months or one year.” (Team member, 
SUBSIDPAY) 
Prior experiences with the client organization where mostly absent in the projects, except for FRONTEND and 
CORPACCESS. In CORPACCESS, the vendor’s project manager and one team member had formerly worked 
in a related project with FINANCE, which was perceived as highly valuable by the client project manager: 
“The project leader had already been part of another FINANCE project. That is, he already had 
know-how and was familiar with the entire applications landscape and its dependencies. And a 
colleague was transferred from the other team, which was perfect because she had a good 
background regarding the interfaces, and exactly this knowledge was missing in our project.” 
(Team member, CORPACCESS) 
The following two examples illustrate the moderating impact of client-specific knowledge (Proposition 5) as 
shown in Table 4. In the project CORPACCESS, the relatively high absorptive capacity of some of the project 
members contributed to the relatively low extra costs in this project in spite of the fact that a medium level of 
client-specific business process knowledge was required. In the project FRONTEND, the Indian vendor had also 
worked with FINANCE before (see above), but in very different projects (low-medium absorptive capacity). 
Still, a large amount of extra costs was incurred in FRONTEND. The system to be re-engineered in the project 
was largely unique and required further transformational business knowledge. Consequently, the vendor needed 
a lot of extra support to be able to understand the highly specific software, especially in terms of knowledge 
transfer, specification and design.  
Overall, the case evidence shows that the offshore vendor’s lack of absorptive capacity may lead to extra costs 
for knowledge transfer, specification and design, coordination, and control, thus supporting Proposition 4. It is 
striking how the lack of absorptive capacity was associated with all types of extra costs that we had previously 
considered in our model. The findings also suggest that prior project related experiences of the vendor led to 
lower extra costs, but that extra costs remained an issue in the presence of a high level of required client-specific 
knowledge, thus supporting the interaction effect between asset specificity and absorptive capacity, as stated in 
Proposition 5. 
 
Personnel turnover. A high turnover rate was one aspect that all maintenance project managers and team 
members invariably complained about, and that also occurred in one development project, CORPORATEPAY.  
“Turnover is very high.“ (Project manager, SUBSIDPAY) 
“We had trouble because of personnel turnover, people disappeared […].” (Project manager, 
INTERCHANGE) 
“Almost every year we have a rotation of the current onsite coordinator because they want to 
return to India.” (Project manager, CORPACCESS) 
“We struggled with the usual things such as extremely high employee turnover.” (Project 
manager, CORPORATEPAY) 
By contrast, in the development project FRONTEND, turnover was not considered to be too problematic. A 
possible explanation for this may be that the kind of re-engineering work of FRONTEND appeared more 
interesting and challenging to the vendor’s employees and was hence considered as a valuable experience.  
“Our attrition rate is 7-8%. This is much lower than the Indian average which is about 30%.” 
(Project Manager, Indian Vendor, FRONTEND) 
“In my case, it is always the same people that I deal with. Therefore, I can say that I have really 
seen quality improvements and advances in learning.” (Team member, FRONTEND) 
The Indian professionals were not shifted to other projects by the vendor. Since FRONTEND showed high extra 
costs in spite of the low attrition, it is likely that the level of required client-specificity knowledge as well the 
vendors lack of absorptive capacity substantially overrides the effect of low turnover. Such moderating effects 
may need to be studied more closely in future research. 
When employee turnover was present at the side of the Indian vendor, it lead to increased costs for knowledge 
transfer because in-house team members had to re-explain and specify things for new offshore team entrants.  
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“The know-how transfer was intense. However, we were not able to benefit from this at all, 
because the people involved have left. There was on key person – she obtained valuable 
knowledge and was gone for good.” (Business manager, CORPORATEPAY) 
The coordination effort for integrating a vendor team in a big organization should not be underestimated either.  
“Every time a new onsite coordinator enters the team, this is related with an incredible amount of 
administrative work: making sure he has passwords and access to a variety of systems.” (Team 
member, CORPACCESS) 
From the case evidence, we conclude that personnel turnover is a vendor-related characteristic that may lead to 
extra client costs. Taking a closer look at the phenomenon of personnel turnover on the vendor’s side, we saw 
the need to distinguish between two forms of personnel turnover that may affect offshore outsourcing projects. 
On the one hand, the offshore vendor himself may move resources that were dedicated to one project to another 
project where they appear to add more value.  
“[…] That was solved in a clever way by the managers in India. They act in a very pragmatic 
way, that’s for sure. They know how to deploy their personnel in the right way.” (Team member, 
CORPACCESS) 
On the other hand, offshore team members may leave the offshore vendor for good in order to work for a 
different company or offshore provider. Both forms may be considered as types of opportunistic behavior. 
Deliberately moving project members to other projects is a practice that was explained by two vendors in the 
cases of SUBSIDPAY and INTERCHANGE. The vendor organization in SUBSIDPAY provides very 
experienced team members from so-called centers of excellence. After a certain period, they are replaced by less 
experienced local team members; the vendor in INTERCHANGE encourages its employees to gain experience 
in different kinds of projects. 
“Typically, what happens in those engagements is that these Centers of Excellence provide the initial 
team which builds the local team and then moves out.” (Vendor, SUBSIDPAY) 
“The point is that you should get used to [personnel turnover]. You cannot ask a person to stay years 
and years in a project, since he personally wants to gain experience, he wants to go on and move to 
different kind of projects.” (Vendor, INTERCHANGE)  
Opportunistic behavior by individuals that leave the vendor organization for good may also cause problems for 
vendors. The project manager of CORPACCESS explained that Indian onsite coordinators that had spent a year 
in Germany like to return to India to find a better job due to their qualifications obtained abroad. Vendors also 
highlighted the positive side of turnover, because it helps them to get fresh people into the organization.  
“We need attrition [personnel turnover]. We do not want to avoid attrition. […] We need fresh people 
in the organization.” (Vendor, FRONTEND) 
Thus, taken together, employee turnover – when present – caused extra costs for the client. This turnover can 
partly be interpreted as opportunistic behavior either at the individual worker or at the vendor level. It should 
also be noted that, on average, employee turnover was seen as relatively high in India which is caused by the 
extremely high volatility and dynamics in the IT labor market of India. There are also some indications that the 
strong motivation of Indian employees to constantly learn makes it difficult for them to stay in one project – in 
particular when a project contains routine work and little intellectual challenge. 
 
Impact of Offshore-Specific Client-Vendor Distance 
From the three offshore-specific client-vendor distance metrics, only geographic distance and cultural distance 
turned out be significant cost drivers for FINANCE. Language differences were found to play a less significant 
role. Due to the strong international orientation of FINANCE, English was well accepted as a business language 
and there were little problems in understanding each other in the projects. Only in the maintenance projects, the 
translation of extensive German documentation caused extra effort. Hence, language issues were not further 
considered in our analysis. In this section, we will illustrate the offshore-specific and vendor-related 
characteristics we observed in the cases. We will explain how those characteristics are related to the observed 
extra costs (Propositions 6). Furthermore, we will analyze the impact of those characteristics in the light of each 
project’s specificity (Propositions 7). 
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Geographic distance. eographic distance and the resulting time difference caused increased client effort and 
time for coordination, control and knowledge transfer. Several interviewees mentioned that complex and tacit 
issues in particular could be better explained face-to-face and that it otherwise took several rounds of conference 
calls and email exchange in order to solve them10. This has been confirmed both by vendors and clients. 
 “We do have communication tools, web conferences and things like that, in place, however, with 
complex issues, face-to-face is a lot more efficient. You are able to reach much smoother and 
simpler solutions. This is what we have realized.” (Business Manager, WEBPORT) 
“Instead of sending a slide and explaining difficult things during a telephone conference, it would 
be a lot easier and faster to explain things on a piece of paper. That is why it is not a bad idea to 
have one or two people supporting the team onsite in order to clarify things that are difficult to 
resolve on the phone.” (Team member, FRONTEND) 
As a consequence, offshore personnel were often required to work onsite, which made it easier for the client to 
explain things and to work out specifications and design issues with the vendor. However, at the same time, 
client resources were necessary to interact with the vendor personnel onside, and this again led to additional 
costs at the client side.  
“Having them [offshore team members] onsite is associated with an enormous amount of costs. 
This eroded the original business case. In order to coordinate all this, I need three additional 
people at my side. This easily increases costs by 600,000 Euros.” (Project Manager, 
CORPRATEPAY). 
Geographic distance thus caused additional costs for the client, supporting that part of Proposition 6. Moreover, 
the problems of high distance were particularly prevalent in the two most client-specific projects FRONTEND 
and CORPORATEPAY, since in these two projects it was necessary for client personnel to fly over to India and 
support the vendor in the actual implementations and testing by providing very detailed design instructions. This 
illustrates the moderating impact of required client-specific knowledge on the link between geographic distance 
and extra costs (Proposition 7). When very client-specific knowledge was required, it was difficult to perform 
the knowledge transfer through electronic media or to substitute knowledge transfer by writing detailed 
specifications. The client actually had to collaborate with vendor personnel face-to-face. In FRONTEND, one 
team member even argued that it is necessary to have both client and vendor personnel working in the same 
office rather than door to door. 
 
Cultural Distance. Throughout the cases, the team members perceived obvious differences in the German and 
the Indian working culture. The Indian professionals strongly adhered to hierarchies and tended to implement 
prescribed specifications with little reflection. This corresponds with well-known findings from previous studies 
(e.g., Heeks et al 2001; Krishna et al. 2004; Nicholson and Sahay 2001). The Indian team members needed 
enhanced support and high social collaboration during the knowledge transfer because of the different learning 
approach and their high conformism. Feedback mechanisms were established in order to recognize 
misunderstandings at an early stage. 
 “[…] we recognized, in the direct contact there will be no such feedback as ‘I do not 
understand’. We have to organize the feedback. That means we have to establish measures in 
order to oblige those who have absorbed information to re-explain it.” (Project manager, 
FRONTEND) 
Differences in the Indian working culture also increased the specification effort; because of the Indian 
professionals’ high conformism, the requirements specifications had to be very accurate. 
“After having completed one phase, we had a bad awakening. The functional specifications 
[which the vendor was responsible for] were inspected and a lot of gaps were identified. This is 
related to the Indian culture. […] What they get as an input, they do not question at all. […] It is 
the mentality of the Indian professionals to always say yes and to scrutinize.” (Team member, 
CORPORATEPAY) 
                                                          
10  There was no evidence in the cases that time zone differences caused problems or extra costs. In contrast, 
physical, i.e. geographic distance was a large issue. Moreover, in neither of the projects, FINANCE attempted a 
24-hour development approach to actually benefit from time zone differences. 
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We also observed that in terms of coordination and control, the internal team had to compensate aspects such as 
the Indian professionals’ tendency to not ask questions and clarify issues.  
 “We told them to come up earlier with partial results. We have had the experience that they 
worked for a long period of time on a document and then we saw that they had moved into a 
completely different direction.” (Team member, SUBSIDPAY) 
“Basically, what they need is feedback: this is the right way, or no, that is the wrong way.” (IT 
unit team member, CORPORATEPAY) 
Organizing feedback is especially important in projects where the vendor is required to absorb a lot of client-
specific knowledge. Since knowledge substitution by providing directions and detailed specifications may be 
hard to achieve in highly specific projects, it is essential that the vendor obtains a good understanding of the 
client’s specific application domain and technical context. In the project FRONTEND, where ensuring that the 
vendor had sufficiently understood the highly client-specific application environment was critical, organizing 
feedback was especially important (moderation effect).  
“It is a cultural issue, the Indian team members find it hard to say ‘I haven’t understood, please 
explain this again’. […] Many of the presentations and explanations we give [during the 
knowledge transfer] end up in a one-way-street, and misunderstandings only turn out when we 
ask the vendor to present what he has done. [...] This is the only way for us to find out how much 
has actually been understood by the vendor.“ (Project manager, FRONTEND)  
The case findings show how cultural distance between German and Indian IS professionals may lead to extra 
costs for knowledge transfer, specification, coordination, and control, thus supporting Proposition 6. There also 
is slight evidence for the moderating effect of required client-specific knowledge on increased control and 
coordination costs due to cultural distance (Proposition 7). 
Other interesting findings that emerged from our cultural analysis include a misconception between FINANCE 
and the vendor about the role of culture.  
“I think that cultural or linguistic problems are minor issues. Culture is not a problem, never.” 
(Vendor, CORPORATEPAY) 
While the vendor in CORPORATEPAY did not perceive cultural issues as problematic, the FINANCE team 
members were well aware of cultural disruptions. They did observe, however, that some of the problems due to 
cultural distance were resolved over time – in particular since in this project, personnel turnover was relatively 
low, supporting the trust building process : 
“Communication between the vendor and the German team members has evolved to be very trustful. 
The vendor now actively addresses problems .” (Team member, CORPORATEPAY) 
 
Discussion 
This study was motivated by the need to improve our understanding why the economic benefits from offshore 
outsourcing vary substantially between projects. While previous literature has focused mainly on relationship 
management issues that should help to address the disruptive challenges of offshore outsourcing, this study 
focuses on the client extra costs that are caused by the clients constructive response to these challenges. Our 
study shows that when offshore outsourcing knowledge work, such as the development and maintenance of 
software applications, extra client costs arise for knowledge integration activities including knowledge transfer 
on the one hand and knowledge substitution through requirements specification and design on the other hand. 
Moreover, extra costs for vendor control and project coordination frequently arise. The level of these extra costs 
was found to be influenced by three types of factors: (1) the nature of the knowledge work being offshored, 
reflected by the extent to which client-specific knowledge is required for task performance, (2) the attributes of 
the vendor, reflected by the vendor’s level of absorptive capacity and the rate of employee turnover at the 
vendor side during the project, and (3) the offshore-specific level of distance between client and vendor, 
reflected by geographic distance and cultural distance. The preceding relationships were based on the 
complementary theoretical lenses of TCE and KBV. The consideration of both theories led to a number of 
theoretical insights that will be discussed next. In order to provide a well-defined context for interpretation, 
however, we begin with highlighting the major limitations of our study. 
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Study Limitations 
There are several limitations to take into account. First and foremost, it should be recognized that the study 
findings are based on a single site case study. The findings may be influenced to a certain extent by the overall 
corporate strategy and culture of the bank. We found a strong identification of the in-house project members 
with their employer and a strong commitment to work in the company’s best interest. This may have increased 
the perception of cultural differences at the client side at the beginning of the projects. On the other hand, we 
could not identify any bias through possible connections between the projects. The projects were completely 
disconnected, the decisions were made independently, and there was little evidence that the management of the 
project was influenced by other projects. Second, it should be kept in mind that we only studied offshore 
outsourcing from a German client to Indian vendors. Thus, the offshore-specific factors and their impacts should 
be treated with caution when studying other client locations or offshore countries. Third, the subjective rating of 
the variables by the authors may still be an issue, even though procedures for increasing internal and external 
validly were followed. Moreover, the fact that the researchers that were involved in selecting and analyzing the 
data were German or educated in Germany (as in case of the research scholar) poses the risk of cultural bias. A 
final limitation is a potential bias in the answers of the interview participants. On the client side, we found this 
concern to be vitiated by the extremely open and even self-critical behavior of the interview participants. This 
was slightly different at the vendor side, where the interview participants were more reserved, avoiding 
statements that could shed a negative light on their individual or company’s performance. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
Keeping the limitations outlined in the previous section in mind, our study offers a number of important 
theoretical contributions.  
Disaggregation of Extra Costs 
First of all, our study makes a contribution by disaggregating client extra management costs into more specific 
costs, including costs for requirements specification and design, knowledge transfer, control, and coordination. 
The distinction between coordination and control costs contributes to more recent claims of keeping these 
constructs separate (Sabherwal and Choudhury 2006; White and Lui 2005). It also acknowledges the demand 
for an explicit assessment of transaction costs and for examining performance implications of governance 
modes given certain types of contingency configurations (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, p. 47). The same applies 
for the consideration of knowledge integration costs including both knowledge transfer and specification 
(knowledge substitution). These two types of costs extend the very one-sided consideration of transaction costs 
in TCE. Whether these costs represent participatory production costs of the client (e.g., “participatory design”, 
Malone and Crowston 1994, p. 95) or whether they present a new form of “cognitive transaction costs” 
(Choudhury 1997) remains to be an issue of debate. In any case, the results show that the cost categories are 
highly complementary in nature. Both control and coordination costs as well as the two types of knowledge 
integration costs were found to arise together, which reinforces previous findings on IT offshore outsourcing 
(Mirani 2007). When comparing control and coordination with specification and knowledge transfer, however, 
these costs arose rather as alternative strategies for managing the contract in two of the cases. The 
disaggregation of extra costs also allows for a better understanding of the theoretical impacts of the sources of 
extra costs. The examination of the rival lines of argumentation between TCE and KBV on the impact of asset 
specificity on control and coordination costs deserves special consideration. 
 
Exploring Rival Lines of Argumentation Between Theories: TCE versus KBV  
While a number of proponents of the KBV have highlighted the fact that asset specificity could lead to market 
inefficiency independent of the presence of vendor opportunism (TCE), empirical evidence for that view has 
been rarely provided. As a second contribution, the results of this study show that in projects with a high level of 
required client-specific knowledge, control and coordination costs can arise – not for safeguarding against 
opportunistic behavior, but rather for constructively reacting to knowledge asymmetries between vendor and 
client which are perceivably high in case of high asset specificity. Moreover, knowledge transfer and 
specification effort was found to be particularly high in cases where the level of client-specific knowledge was 
rated high. This does not imply, however, that opportunism is irrelevant in offshore outsourcing. The project 
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staffing management of the vendor could be viewed as a form of opportunistic behavior, which is taken up in 
the next section.  
Theory Extension: Offshore-specific and Vendor-related Characteristics May Cause Additional Client 
Effort 
The third contribution of this study lies in its differentiated analysis of the impact of certain offshore-specific 
(geographic distance, cultural distance) and vendor-related characteristics (absorptive capacity, personnel 
turnover) on extra costs of offshore application software projects. The cultural distance between Indian and 
German project members can be traced back to differences in power distance between the two nations. Power 
distance refers to the extent to which less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) 
accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. Cross-cultural research has shown that power distance is 
higher in India than in Germany (Hofstede 1980). In our projects, the high level of power distance in India was 
reflected in certain behaviors that have also been stressed out in research of Anglo-American origin (Heeks et al. 
2001; Krishna et al. 2004; Nicholson and Sahay 2001), such as a high level of conformism (tendency to say yes) 
as well as obedience to and dependence on rules and obligations among Indian IS professionals. These culturally 
induced behaviors particularly increased the clients’ effort for specification, knowledge transfer and vendor 
control.  
Besides its high level of power distance, the Indian culture is characterized by a relatively high level of 
collectivism (Hofstede 1980). This concept stipulates the formation of in-group behavior (Hui and Triandis 
1986). Chen et al. (2002, p. 289) have argued that “(...) collectivists typically draw the distinction between those 
they are personally related to (in-groups) and those they are not (out-groups)”. This means that significant effort 
has to be invested in forming a common knowledge space (“ba”) (Nonaka and Konno 1998) until the Indian IS 
professionals – that together may form an in-group – openly communicate and exchange tacit knowledge with 
German client personnel. The German team may indeed behave as an in-group as well – either because of the 
corporate culture or because of the national German culture which also has a slight tendency towards 
collectivism (Hofstede 1980). Thus, similarity in the cultural dimension “collectivism” between two cultural 
groups may not automatically lead to the absence of cultural clashes. Rather, a process of convergence is 
required to form a collective of two distinct collectivist (in-)groups. The client’s effort for enabling such a 
convergence process causes coordination costs. Such costs together with control and knowledge transfer costs 
were also found to increase due to the geographic distance between client and vendor. 
 
In addition to the offshore-specific characteristics, two vendor-related offshore features were found to be 
associated with extra costs at the client side, namely the level of absorptive capacity and the degree of turnover 
of vendor staff. Our study results showed that from all offshore-specific and vendor-related characteristics, the 
level of absorptive capacity of the vendor had the widest impact on extra costs. While absorptive capacity may 
be influenced by different factors (Lane et al. 2006; Malhotra et al. 2005), the results of our study suggest that 
prior experiences of the vendor personnel with related projects (e.g., similar technology and business processes) 
where the best indicator for a high level of absorptive capacity. A low level of absorptive capacity leads to 
increased knowledge transfer effort on the client side and a higher need for detailed specifications. In two of the 
cases, the client even resigned and took over part of the design work of the vendor because the costs of 
specification and knowledge transfer had been getting too high. In addition, control effort to ensure appropriate 
software quality increases due to the vendor’s lack of creativity in designing innovative and high quality 
software solutions. These findings go beyond the resource-based reasoning that vendor capabilities are critical 
for outsourcing success (Goles 2003). In line with the KBV of the firm, our findings suggest that in addition to 
existing capabilities such as technical and project management capabilities, the potential to absorb new 
knowledge is crucial. This is consistent with findings from previous studies which suggest that in many 
outsourced projects knowledge overlaps between client and vendor are required, calling for knowledge 
exchange processes between both parties (Tiwana 2004).  
What also appeared to be a severe problem was the degree of personnel turnover at the vendor side. Once the 
knowledge transfer which initially occurred onsite was completed, the vendor staff was often either transferred 
to other clients or left the vendor company for good. This then forced the client to repeat the knowledge transfer 
with the replacement staff which lead to increased effort. To avoid turnover, the client had to more closely 
observe the vendor’s recruiting and personnel management, which lead to increased control and coordination 
effort. This finding is consistent with TCE logic that control and coordination costs arise for safeguarding 
against opportunistic behavior. When personnel leaves for good, this may be viewed as a form of opportunistic 
behavior at the individual level that negatively affects both the vendor’s and the client’s costs. When the vendor 
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transfers personnel from one client account to another without informing the client about such intentions prior to 
entering the contract, this may be viewed as another, more severe form of opportunistic vendor behavior. 
 
Theory Integration: The Interplay of TCE and Vendor-related and Offshore-specific Characteristics 
The fourth important contribution lies in theory integration by establishing a moderating link between the level 
of client-specific knowledge and the impact of both general offshore attributes and vendor-related 
characteristics. The level of client specific knowledge and the vendor’s level of absorptive capacity were found 
to interact in their influence on client extra costs. For example, when both asset specificity was high, i.e. when a 
lot of unique process and/or software knowledge was required to perform the development and maintenance 
work, and the vendor’s absorptive capacity was low, extra cost were found be particularly high. Additionally, 
slight evidence was found that the impact of offshore-specific factors, i.e. geographic and cultural distance, on 
extra costs was leveraged in projects with a high level of required client-specific knowledge. In projects with 
low asset specificity, such as the development project WEBPORT, little knowledge about unique business 
processes of the bank was required. Accordingly, a lack of absorptive capacity had no dramatic impact on extra 
costs. The vendor could mostly draw on standard knowledge about how to build a web interface following the 
specifications of the client. However, in the development project CORPORATEPAY, where a lot of profound 
understanding of the idiosyncratic billing processes of the bank was required, the lack of prior experience of the 
mostly young vendor staff caused a great amount of extra effort on the client side. This effort even increases if 
the vendor personnel are very hesitant to ask questions and to actively participate in the knowledge exchange 
process (impact of cultural differences). Moreover, the moderating effect of specificity was shown in the 
projects CORPACCESS and FRONTEND. In both projects, FINANCE had previous experience with the Indian 
vendors. As in CORPACCESS the level of vendor absorptive capacity was high, only little extra costs were 
incurred despite the project’s medium specificity. In contrast, the vendor in FRONTEND had less project related 
experience (medium) and had difficulty in understanding the highly specific system and business logic. 
Therefore, the positive impact of the vendor’s absorptive capacity was overridden by the negative impact of 
specificity, thus leading to high extra costs. 
 
Future Research  
Resuming the previous discussion of the study limitations and its findings, a number of implications for future 
research emerge. First, our single site research design calls for replication studies that use multiple sites in 
different industries in order to enrich the insight into the investigated phenomena. Second, it would be necessary 
to study our frame from the perspective of other cultures both from the client and the vendor side. For example, 
it would be interesting to examine whether cultural differences are smaller in nearshore arrangements (e.g., 
between Germany and Russia) and whether this would lead to comparatively lower extra costs on the client side. 
Third, the formation of cross-national research teams, where researchers from both the client and the vendor 
country are included, may be a fruitful way to avoid national biases by the researchers and provide better access 
to informants of foreign countries (Niederman 2005). Fourth, although very demanding, a longitudinal 
perspective could yield further insight into the phenomena observed. For example, an evolutionary study that 
examines the offshore outsourcing costs over time associated with dynamics in the independent variables could 
reveal how transaction frequency and organizational learning influence the economic outcome of such projects. 
A number of interesting questions could be associated with such a design. Are offshore characteristics, such as 
cultural distance, a persistent phenomenon or do they disappear over time? Do offshore vendors catch up in 
absorptive capacity? Fifth, whilst looking on vendor absorptive capacity, another promising research approach 
would be to look closer on the client side. Which capabilities are necessary at the client organization and is the 
client able to positively influence the absorptive capacity of the vendor (Erickson and Ranganathan 2006; Gupta 
and Govindarajan 2000; Tiwana 2004)? How can the knowledge transfer from the client organization to the 
vendor organization be managed more effectively? In this context, emerging tools for distributed software 
development or collaborative software development with substantial requirements engineering and knowledge 
management capabilities could facilitate the client vendor relationship, reducing extra costs in offshore 
outsourcing settings (Ciborra and Andreu 2001; Rus and Lindvall 2002). Finally, while our study has only 
focused on non-captive offshoring arrangements, the question is raised whether captive arrangements where the 
client holds part or all of the vendor capital may help to overcome some of the disruptive challenges of 
offshoring without leading to significant extra costs at the client side (e.g., for managing employee turnover) 
(for a recent study of differences between captive and non-captive arrangements see Levina 2006). Incomplete 
contracts theory may be promising for examining the effect of ownership on residual control rights over vendor 
personnel (Hart and Moore 1990). 
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Conclusion 
Although many companies claim to realize significant cost advantages through offshore outsourcing of IS 
services, this paper suggests that there is a need for a more profound and differentiated analysis of the economic 
benefits associated with offshore outsourcing. While labor cost savings are a constituent factor in offshore 
outsourcing leading to production cost savings, the findings of this paper indicate that additional types of costs 
may arise when software projects are offshored which may offset initial labor cost benefits. This paper has 
shown how TCE and KBV may be applied to the offshore outsourcing scenario in order to be able to understand 
variations in client extra costs between offshored software projects. Extra costs were disaggregated into different 
categories, and TCE and KBV were extended by including offshore-specific factors such as geographic distance 
and cultural distance between client and offshore vendor. Despite the limitations that we addressed at the 
beginning of the discussion, this paper is unique in a sense that it builds upon and extends two complementary 
theories of the firm that have rarely been jointly applied in the context of outsourcing or offshoring. The study 
makes a unique contribution to the IS offshoring and outsourcing literature in that it highlights how important it 
is to recognize the nature of the task being offshored when making the IS offshore outsourcing decision and 
when searching for appropriate responses in managing the specific challenges of offshore outsourcing. When a 
high level of client-specific knowledge is required for task performance, the client is unlikely to achieve the 
desired economic benefits from offshore outsourcing – in particular when the vendor lacks prior experiences in 
the task domain and hence shows a relatively low level of absorptive capacity. Slight evidence was found that 
required client-specific knowledge leverages the offshore-specific challenges such as cultural differences and 
geographic distance. Future research should be encouraged to further examine the implication of various types 
of contingencies, such as the nature of the task, when searching for efficient strategies to capitalize on the 
benefits of the global division of labor.  
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Appendix A 
  
Attributes Used to Assess the FINANCE Projects (based on Dubé and Paré, 2003) 
Research Design 
 
Nature of own study  Positivist, explanatory study with some exploratory elements (see also Lee 
1991) 
Clear research questions Yes 
A priori specification of 
constructs 
Yes, due to explanatory character 
Clean theoretical slate No, propositions were formulated a priori due to explanatory nature 
Theory of interest Transaction cost economics and knowledge-based view 
Rival theories included Yes, rival explanations of TCE versus KBV were examined regarding the 
impact of client-specific knowledge on control and coordination costs 
Multiple case design Yes, one organization, six projects; every project represents a case 
Replication logic Both theoretical and literal replication logic  
Unit of analysis Six offshored projects which are well stated and well documented; the unit of 
analysis is consistent with the boundaries of the theories tested. 
A global German financial services provider has been chosen since it is an 
early mover in IT offshoring and since we wanted to incorporate a setting with 
a potential language barrier; for both countries English is not the mother 
language 
Pilot case Not conducted, since it is recommended for studies with highly exploratory 
nature 
Team-based research Yes 
Different roles of 
investigators 
First author and research scholar undertook data collection 
Second author and first author coded and interpreted the data independently 
Third author reconciled coding and interpretation differences 
Context description 
 
Detailed site description Yes 
Case period Yes, the case material was collected during a period of six months with several 
onsite visits and follow-up phone calls 
Longitudinal design No, not applicable 
Time spent onsite by the 
researchers 
Yes, for setting up the case study design with top management and for 
conducting interviews and for presenting final results 
Nature of data collection Retrospective 
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Elucidation of data collection process 
 
Multiple data collection 
methods 
Yes; data was solicited from different stakeholders via 
interviews; official project documentations from the 
client organization were fully available and added into 
the analysis 
Qualitative and quantitative 
data 
Qualitative only 
Data Triangulation Yes, for different stakeholders and sources 
Case Study Protocol Yes 
Case Study Database Yes, using the software package NVIVO 
Data Collection Methods Applied 
 
Interviews Yes  
Documentation Yes 
Observation No 
Questionnaires Yes, in the form of interview guides 
Artifacts No, only examination of the software systems that were offshored 
Time Series No 
Sampling Strategy 
 
Combination of convenient sample and quota sample (three projects of IS 
development and three projects of IS maintenance) 
Elucidation of data analysis process 
 
Field notes Yes 
Coding Yes 
Data displays Yes 
Flexible and opportunistic 
process 
Yes 
Logical chain of evidence Yes 
Empirical testing Yes 
Explanation building Yes 
Time series analysis No 
Searching for cross-case 
patterns 
Yes 
Use of natural controls No 
Quotes (evidence) Yes 
Project reviews Yes 
Comparison with extant 
literature 
Yes, especially with supporting literature 
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Appendix B 
 
High-level Interview Guideline 
 
0) Introduction 
0.1 Since when are you involved in this project? 
0.2 What is your task in this team? Which aspects do you concentrate on? 
 
1) Decision process and project characteristics 
1.1 Why did ABC choose to offshore this project?  
1.2 Which characteristics of this project make it suitable for offshore outsourcing? 
1.3 Which parts of the IS function remained in-house? 
 
3) Requirements and Realization 
3.1 How much domain or firm-specific know-how is needed for the outsourced task? 
3.2 In which way are requirements designed and communicated to the vendor? 
3.3 How many of the arising issues are due to incomplete or vague requirements specification? 
 
2) Transition phase 
2.1 How did the knowledge transfer take place?  
2.2 Who was responsible for providing the specifications? 
3) Delivery phase 
3.1 How is the internal and offshore team structure of this project organized?  
3.2 What are the main mechanisms for managing this project? 
3.3 How is your contract with the vendor specified and enacted?  
3.4 Are there misunderstandings? What are the main reasons?  
3.5 What are the main challenges in this project? 
3.6 Has something changed in the service quality since the offshore outsourcing arrangement? 
 
4) Outcome  
4.1 How was the sourcing decision evaluated? 
4.2 Were the expectations met? 
4.3 Did unexpected additional costs arise? 
4.4 Are you satisfied with the offshore outsourcing arrangement? 
 
 
